By Alicia García-Herrero

In mid-August, Chinese shipping company Sea Legend said it would start a container service through the Arctic, transiting Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR) to sail from China to Rotterdam in about twenty days – roughly half the time of the route through the Suez Canal. Chinese shipping in the Arctic is not new: its ships have passed through the NSR several times in the past few years.

However, these voyages were exploratory and irregular. The new service marks the first regularly scheduled commercial transit of the Arctic Ocean.

The overall planned volume is relatively small, as the fleet consists only of seven modestly-sized container ships which will operate the route for four months a year. Arctic vessels will be only a fifth of the size of container ships that pass via the Suez Canal, which accounts for about an eighth of world trade. The significance of the Sea Legend plan comes from the fact that transiting the Arctic Ocean can be scheduled, priced and repeated, meaning the route can be integrated into supply chains. Its appeal is likely to grow as traditional routes, such as the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, become riskier.

The NSR differs from other routes in that, de facto, freedom of navigation does not apply to it. Russia does not consider it to be an open international waterway and controls the bulk of the route. Russia issues the permits and collects fees through its state nuclear company, Rosatom, which operates the heavy icebreakers required to escort cargo ships through the icy waters.

The United States has argued for decades that Russia's expansive claim over these waters is inconsistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and that the NSR should be treated like an international strait. By operating via the route, China now implicitly acknowledges and legitimises the Russian position by complying with Russia’s required fees and permits.

China is not an Arctic state, though it has observer status in the Arctic Council. Its access to the Arctic depends heavily on Russia. For the NSR, it depends fully on Russia. In most other arenas – notably sanctions evasion and energy purchases – Moscow plays the junior partner to Beijing. In the Arctic, Russia has opened its most strategic waterway in exchange for transit fees, joint shipbuilding, crew training and political alignment. Russia controls access, but it is selling it in the context of economic duress from Western sanctions.

The US has long anticipated this development and is examining alternative Arctic routes for its own shipping. One of these is the Northwest Passage, which transits the Canadian Arctic. This, however, is hampered by erratic weather and shallow water; it is also subject to an unresolved dispute – similar to that affecting the NSR – in which Washington wants the passage to be treated as an international strait, while Ottawa treats it as internal waters. The second option is the Transpolar Sea Route, which runs through the centre of the Arctic Ocean, avoiding any country’s jurisdiction – and thus fees and permissions – though the remoteness and remaining sea ice hinder this route’s feasibility.

Other options would require heavy icebreakers, on which the United States lags badly. Russia operates the world’s largest icebreaker fleet of more than 40 polar vessels (though many are ageing). China has three, one domestically built, and is adding a nuclear-powered vessel. The US, meanwhile, has just one functioning heavy icebreaker and one medium icebreaker. It is trying to catch up by signing a $6.1 billion contract with Finland for 11 medium icebreakers, seven of which will be built in the US and four in Finnish shipyards to speed delivery and draw on Finnish expertise.

The disparity in Arctic shipping illustrates a broader geopolitical reality: China’s lead is derived from its industrial capacity. In shipbuilding, drones, batteries and much else that can be produced at scale, it is outpacing the US and reaping the resulting rewards. The icebreaker shortfall shows the US lacks an industrial base that can build what strategy requires.

China’s new Arctic shipping route is not only a result of its geography; it is a consequence of Russia’s dependence on China and of Chinese economic and industrial muscle. Both of these advantages are the product of deliberate Chinese strategy. For the US, and still more for Europe, the Arctic shows that industrial capacity, economic weight and negotiated access have become central factors in geopolitical competition.

El País

The views in the article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of InfoBRICS. https://www.bruegel.org/first-glance/chinas-arctic-silk-road-now-reality 21 СЕНТЯБРЯ IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII Россия и Китай обсудили сотрудничество в сфере обращения с отходами

Состоялось второе заседание российско-китайской рабочей группы, занимающейся вопросами сотрудничества в сфере обращения с отходами, говорится в сообщении министерства природных ресурсов и экологии РФ. Мероприятие прошло в режиме видеоконференции под сопредседательством директора департамента экономики замкнутого цикла в сфере отходов производства и потребления Минприроды РФ Андрея Федотовского и заместителя директора департамента по обращению с твердыми отходами и химическими веществами Министерства экологии и окружающей среды КНР Вэнь Сюэфэна.

В ходе встречи стороны поделились наработками по реформированию отрасли: обсудили ужесточение требований к утилизации упаковки в России, цифровизацию процессов, а также новый экологический кодекс КНР, который вступил в силу 15 августа 2026 г. Отдельно были рассмотрены методы переработки многослойных и трудноизвлекаемых упаковочных материалов.

Российские представители проявили интерес к китайским решениям в области термической переработки отходов. На перспективу запланировано углубление взаимодействия – предполагается наладить прямые контакты между предприятиями в сфере энергетической утилизации, а также сохранить регулярный обмен нормативно-правовыми актами. В период между заседаниями была достигнута договоренность об организации выездных стажировок для изучения региональных практик переработки отходов, проведении профильных семинаров и круглых столов по актуальным вопросам, отмечается в сообщении.

Третье заседание рабочей группы запланировано на 2027 г. и пройдет в Китае. Кроме того, уже в сентябре этого года сопредседатели встретятся вновь – в рамках 21-го заседания Подкомиссии по сотрудничеству в области охраны окружающей среды, действующей при Российско-Китайской комиссии по подготовке регулярных встреч глав правительств.

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