By Dr. Rahul Mishra
After a 14-year hiatus, the leaders of the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum assembled in Johannesburg, South Africa, for the sixth IBSA Summit on the sidelines of the twentieth G20 Summit. The ‘resurrection’ of IBSA is happening at a time when the liberal international order is rupturing at all ends. Trump’s tariff war on friends and enemies alike, the US-China rivalry and scramble for rare earth minerals, Russia-Ukraine conflict, and China’s belligerent postures in South and East China Seas has damaged the very foundations of the free and open liberal global economic order so carefully built by the US, Europe, and other liberal economies after the end of the Second World War.
Members of IBSA find themselves in a precarious situation: all of them have come to a rather painful realisation that a win-win partnership with China is a mirage, while a collaboration with the US comes with its own set of constraints and challenges – as India is experiencing with Trump. Aspiring to shoulder the leadership of the Global South, these countries are yet to find a place at the global high table – the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and are yet to reach the level at the IMF (International Monetary Fund) or even AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), where they could play a decisive role. Limited technology transfer from the superpowers and a domestic resource crunch leave these countries in a situation that makes it logical for them to work together.
In 2003, when IBSA was established, the global political-security and economic landscape was different. China’s “peaceful rise,” aka “peaceful development,” rhetoric was still acceptable, and Russia was still trying hard to mend ties with the US and Europe. Today, both these countries are on different footing. Their concerns are no longer aligned with those of the IBSA countries.
Nonetheless, in its first decade, IBSA emerged as one of the most ambitious attempts to institutionalise South–South cooperation among three major democracies of the Global South. It brought together India, Brazil, and South Africa—regional leaders with shared interests in global multilateral reforms, inclusive development, and equitable global governance.
IBSA’s momentum stalled after 2011 due to the rise of BRICS, domestic political changes in member states, and their shifting regional and global strategies. However, its underlying rationale remains compelling even today. The evolving global order makes the revival of IBSA not only timely but necessary. The forum’s unique democratic identity, development partnership model, and multilateral reform agenda offer distinct value that is unmatched by other groupings in the Global South.
At its core, IBSA, the only minilateral grouping with countries representing three different continents, is an unique ‘non-Western’, ‘minilateral’ institution, which is yet to see its best days. It is built on three pillars: political dialogue, sectoral cooperation, and development partnerships. Each of these pillars continues to hold strategic significance.
First, IBSA provides a platform for political coordination among three influential, multiethnic democracies of the Global South. Unlike BRICS, which includes China and Russia, IBSA is anchored in shared political values: pluralism, constitutional democracy, transparency, and rule of law. This democratic identity gives the forum moral authority in advocating for a more inclusive and participatory global governance architecture. India, Brazil, and South Africa have all sought greater representation in institutions such as the UN Security Council (UNSC), the World Bank, and the IMF. IBSA acts as a vehicle for harmonising its reform proposals and amplifying its collective voice in global arenas.
Second, IBSA’s South–South cooperation model is development-centric and demand-driven. Its flagship initiative, the IBSA Fund for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation, launched in 2004, is widely regarded as one of the most effective South–South development funds. The fund has supported projects in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Its emphasis on capacity-building, local empowerment, and sustainability demonstrates an alternative to traditional donor-recipient dynamics. Thus, IBSA operationalises solidarity in development and highlights how emerging powers can contribute responsibly to global welfare.
Third, sectoral cooperation within IBSA spans over a dozen working groups—from trade facilitation and agriculture to health, education, and science and technology. These exchanges allow the three countries to share best practices, pool knowledge, and jointly address challenges they face as developing, industrialising economies. Their collaboration on renewable energy, public health, and e-governance demonstrates how IBSA members can co-create solutions adaptable across the Global South. Despite its strong foundations, IBSA’s political activation slowed. Several reasons contributed to this decline. The launch of BRICS in 2009 overshadowed IBSA, partly because BRICS came with greater geopolitical weight and the economic magnetism of China. Member states, dealing with domestic transitions—Brazil’s impeachment process, South Africa’s political turbulence, and India’s shifting foreign policy priorities—also turned their diplomatic attention to other platforms, such as BRICS, the G20, and bilateral engagements.
Yet the assumption that BRICS could replace IBSA proved misguided. BRICS does not offer the shared value-based identity, democratic coherence, or development-driven framework that made IBSA distinctive. Furthermore, as geopolitical competition between China and Russia intensified, the BRICS increasingly reflected major-power contestations rather than the developmental concerns of medium powers. It has created a vacuum that IBSA is uniquely positioned to fill.
Several compelling factors make a strong case for the revival and revitalisation of IBSA in the current global context.
With rising authoritarianism and democratic backsliding worldwide, IBSA’s identity as a coalition of large democracies is more relevant than ever. India, Brazil, and South Africa can collectively champion democratic norms in global governance without being seen as part of Western alliances. Their legitimacy stems from their own histories of postcolonial development, multicultural societies, and democratic transformation. The revival of IBSA would therefore strengthen the normative leadership of democracies outside the Global North.
All three countries continue to aspire to permanent membership of the UNSC. But their reform agendas have weakened due to fragmented advocacy. A revived IBSA can articulate a united, coherent, and persuasive position on UNSC reform, Bretton Woods reform, and the restructuring of global trade governance. As middle powers with shared interests, they can coordinate strategies and mobilise broader coalitions in the Global South.
IBSA is not an alternative to BRICS but a complement. The two groupings serve different purposes: while BRICS is increasingly geopolitical, IBSA is developmental and values-driven. Reviving IBSA would allow members to balance their engagements with China and Russia. It offers them a platform to express positions independently of great-power dynamics and to cooperate without strategic constraints.
The IBSA Fund has demonstrated high impact at low cost. In a world facing widening development gaps, economic inequality, and climate vulnerability, enhancing the fund’s resources and expanding its reach would reaffirm IBSA’s moral leadership. The three countries can pioneer innovative development finance tools, technology-sharing models, and climate resilience initiatives tailored for low-income countries.
India, Brazil, and South Africa share similar geopolitical orientations: strategic autonomy, issue-based multipolarity, and emphasis on multilateral diplomacy. They are not aligned with any single power bloc, enabling flexible coalition-building. Reviving IBSA would allow them to act as stabilising actors in the evolving international system and shape the emerging multipolar order from the perspective of developing democracies.
IBSA economies have potential synergies in energy transition, digital economy, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, space technology, and defence production. Joint initiatives in these sectors can enhance resilience, reduce dependence on external suppliers, and create new South–South value chains. Sectoral working groups, if revitalised, can deliver high-impact cross-regional cooperation.
The India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum retains enduring relevance as a platform for democratic collaboration, South–South solidarity, and global governance reform. Its distinct identity—rooted in shared political values, development-focused cooperation, and a commitment to multilateralism—offers something no other forum in the Global South provides. In a world marked by geopolitical fragmentation, rising inequality, and shifting power balances, the revival of IBSA is both timely and necessary. By reinvigorating political dialogue, expanding the IBSA Fund, strengthening sectoral cooperation, and articulating a unified position on global governance reform, India, Brazil, and South Africa can reaffirm their leadership in shaping a more equitable and inclusive international order.
Dr. Rahul Mishra is an Associate Professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, and a Senior Research Fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, Thammasat University, Thailand.
Eurasia Review
The views in the article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of InfoBRICS.
