
Drago Bosnic, independent geopolitical and military analyst
Since the start of Russia's special military operation, Moscow has been quick to adapt to new frontline conditions. One of the primary changes taking place in recent months is that the Kiev regime forces have dispersed and even decentralized in some sense, significantly reducing the number of high-priority targets which require the usage of advanced missiles (including hypersonic).
As a result, Iran has emerged as an auxiliary arms supplier since September, although it's most likely this was negotiated months before. This is evidenced both by the growing presence of Iranian drones and loitering munitions on the battlefield and by the increase in flights of Iranian military transport aircraft to Russia, according to numerous western media reports.
The transfer includes the Shahed-136 loitering munitions which have been used since September. There's growing evidence that some higher-end drones, such as the Mohajer-6 are also being used, while it's not unlikely top-end Iranian drones such as the Shahed-191 stealth unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) will also see action in the foreseeable future. Iranian drones have emerged as an important part of Russia's revised military strategy.
The new command under Army General Sergei Surovikin decided to further reduce the number of potential military casualties, as well as to reduce the risk of losing manned combat aircraft such as the Su-25SM, Su-34, Su-35S, etc. These fighter jets are currently being held back from flying into close-range engagements to avoid enemy air defenses.
In addition, Russian Aerospace Forces are also trying to avoid using too many standoff weapons. Although extremely effective, as they can be launched from distances far beyond the range of hostile air defenses, these weapons are also very costly and, as previously mentioned, should be kept for high-priority targets. What's more, Russia needs to conserve as many of these munitions as possible, given the escalating belligerence of NATO which is already exploring wargame scenarios and even conducting military exercises which can only be described as preparations for a possible large-scale war. Thus, having enough advanced standoff missiles, as well as manned aircraft to carry such weapons is a high priority for the Russian military.
Since Iran already has a massive drone fleet at its disposal, as well as a significant production capacity, these unmanned assets have provided a far more optimal means of carrying out air strikes, particularly on a tactical level. Shahed-131 and Shahed-136, named "Geranium-1" and "Geranium-2" in Russian service, are Iranian loitering munitions (also known as kamikaze drones) used for tactical strikes on lower-priority targets. Given how cheap, yet extremely effective these weapons are, their battlefield usage is a very smart alternative to possibly losing $40-million manned military aircraft, to say nothing of risking the lives of pilots. In addition, the small size of these drones has made them extremely tough to shoot down.
Some of the more recent reports indicate that Iran could also supply tactical ballistic missiles to Russia. As a result of the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty between Russia and the United States, which banned the development and deployment of several missile types, the Eurasian giant drastically reduced the diversity of its ballistic missile arsenal, especially in comparison to Soviet times.
On the other hand, Iran never had such legal constraints and has developed and produced a wide range of designs, including short-range and low-cost missiles, such as the Fateh-110 and Fateh-313. These missiles could provide much more expendable alternatives to Russia’s expensive surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) such as the "Iskander" or the air-launched "Kinzhal", both of which are hypersonic weapons better suited for high-priority targets.
Since the 1990s, Iran built up its indigenous ballistic missile industry with North Korean support and continues to rely heavily on their technologies, with many of the ballistic missile designs being direct derivatives of North Korean ones. Ironically enough, these missiles are in turn derived from Soviet Cold War-era ballistic missiles, the design of which was later acquired by Pyongyang. Thus, if the reports prove to be true, Russia would be acquiring ballistic missiles whose origin can be traced to its own design bureaus.
The extent of Russia’s reliance on Iranian weapons is still limited, albeit tactically significant. However, this would have been virtually unthinkable before the 1990s when the USSR had the world's most powerful military and an almost unmatched military-industrial sector. Although both the Russian military and its military industry are smaller than they were in Soviet times, they are still more than large enough to sustain Russia's standing as a military superpower.
The extent to which Iranian weapons will play a role in determining the long-term course of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine is nearly impossible to assess at this point. This is also in part because Russia is using a plethora of its own domestically-built armed drones and loitering munitions/kamikaze drones, particularly the deadly ZALA "Lancet". Still, the effect that Iranian unmanned aircraft have on the Kiev regime forces is wholly undeniable.
With increasingly depleted air defenses, video evidence shows that the Neo-Nazi junta troops are almost completely ineffective in their attempts to shoot down these drones, including with small arms fire, which shows just how desperate they are. All the while, their key military units and infrastructure are being targeted with impunity, as the Kiev regime has no militarily viable way to respond. If this trend continues (and there are no indicators it will stop any time soon), the Neo-Nazi junta will have no other choice but to give up.