By Ramananda Sengupta

The latest India-China strategic dialogue in New Delhi unfolded against a markedly more complex geopolitical backdrop, shaped as much by unresolved bilateral frictions as by growing uncertainty in the wider international system.

Led by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Chinese Executive Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu, the talks focused on trade-related concerns, border stability, and incremental steps to rebuild a relationship badly strained since the 2020 eastern Ladakh crisis.

Official readouts from New Delhi underlined that discussions centred on reviewing recent progress in stabilising ties following the October 2024 disengagement agreement along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Both sides reiterated that peace and tranquillity in the border areas remain indispensable for overall progress in bilateral relations, a formulation that continues to anchor India’s approach to normalisation with China.

The meeting took place under the framework of the India–China Strategic Dialogue and on the sidelines of the BRICS Sherpa meeting, which Ma is attending during his visit to India. It also forms part of a broader pattern of high-level engagement since the two countries’ leaders met last year to arrest the deterioration in ties that followed the 2020 border clash.

Trade concerns featured prominently, with both sides agreeing on the need to approach economic issues from a “political and strategic direction”, in line with guidance from their respective leaderships. While the Indian government did not publicly spell out the issues discussed, External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said the dialogue addressed “concerns on sensitive issues.”

Indian concerns are understood to include China’s export control measures on rare earth minerals, as well as recent supply disruptions involving specialised fertilisers, tunnel boring machines and rare earth magnets. These issues reflect New Delhi’s unease over what it sees as the growing weaponisation of economic dependencies, even as bilateral trade remains substantial.

Both sides recognised the need for an early conclusion of an updated air services agreement to improve connectivity, alongside continued steps on visa facilitation and people-to-people exchanges. Misri also noted the successful resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra in 2025, suspended since 2020, and expressed hope for expanding its scale.

Despite the broader agenda, border stability remained the central pillar of engagement. The Indian readout once again stressed that peace along the LAC is a prerequisite for normalisation. While the first stage of the 3D process—disengagement, de-escalation and de-induction—is complete, the other two steps have seen limited progress.

The Chinese side described the talks as “friendly, candid and in-depth”, covering international and regional issues as well as respective internal and external policies. Beijing reiterated that India and China should see each other as cooperative partners rather than competitors and manage differences prudently while promoting ties along a “sound and steady track”.

This cautious thaw is taking place in a geopolitical environment complicated by the return of Donald Trump to the White House. Strategic commentary has noted that Trump’s second term has introduced new ambiguities for India, with negative signals on tariffs, Pakistan and India’s energy ties with Russia, and a perceived downgrading of India’s geopolitical relevance.

Unlike Trump’s first term, when Washington formally identified China as a “strategic competitor”, the current US approach is widely seen as less coherent. Beijing believes it has weathered the trade, tariff and export control pressures from Washington, even as it remains convinced that the US seeks to slow China’s rise. Trump’s pursuit of what he has described as a “beautiful deal” with China appears to prioritise short-term economic outcomes over strategic clarity, with serious dialogue underway and the possibility of a Trump visit to China later this year.

In this context, India and China are both seeking greater strategic space, contributing to the present phase of calibrated engagement. However, analysts caution that the India–China relationship has its own internal drivers that will ultimately shape its trajectory, irrespective of turbulence in US policy.

Recent engagements, including Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to India, have produced limited but tangible outcomes, such as a 10-point understanding covering the resumption of direct flights and reopening of three border trade points. These steps build on the process initiated at Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s meeting with President Xi Jinping in October last year.

However, the evidence so far suggests what has been described as a tactical outreach by China, rather than a substantive accommodation of India’s core concerns. Structural challenges persist, including unresolved border issues, trade asymmetries and growing strategic distrust.

More ominously, Indian assessments have highlighted China–Pakistan battlefield collusion, demonstrated during Operation Sindoor in May 2025, where Chinese support reportedly went beyond diplomacy to include advanced weaponry and credible operational assistance. China’s construction of a massive hydropower project upstream, without accommodating India’s interests as a lower riparian, has added to these concerns.

Alongside strategic dialogue, China’s decision to participate in India’s AI Impact Summit from February 16 to 20 signals a tentative opening in technology diplomacy. A senior Chinese delegation is expected, even as the United States also sends a high-level team. New Delhi has framed the summit as a platform to bridge advanced economies and the Global South on AI governance, underscoring India’s aspiration to act as a convening power amid intensifying technological competition.

As Prime Minister Modi has conveyed, India seeks stable, predictable and constructive relations with China. Yet, official and analytical assessments alike stress that this objective must be pursued realistically. Chinese media commentary remains sceptical of India’s China policy, interpreting recent engagement as a sign of Indian vulnerability linked to strains in India–US ties.

The bottom line, as strategic commentary notes, is that India’s anxieties with Washington cannot be resolved by making common cause with China, which remains its primary long-term strategic challenge.

Seen in this light, the renewed engagement with China also reflects a broader recalibration underway in Indian foreign policy. Former Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale has argued that as India negotiates trade deals and builds defence partnerships with a range of countries, it is seeking to reduce strategic dependence on any single power.

Speaking to StratNews Global Editor-in-Chief Nitin A. Gokhale, he said there is a growing recognition in New Delhi that “if China is a long-term adversary, the United States is a short-term problem,” underscoring why India can afford neither alignment nor estrangement with either side.

Unless conditions on the ground change materially, the current process of normalisation is likely to remain carefully calibrated. A full reset in ties is not yet a realistic proposition, and expectations from forthcoming high-level visits should be tempered accordingly.

StratNews Global