By Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam
The recent inclusion of Indonesia in BRICS signals the continued strengthening and geographic expansion of the grouping. The growing interest in BRICS membership suggests a broader perception among states that the bloc represents a possible substitute to the institutions dominated by the West and a platform for the growing aspirations of Global South states striving for a reconfigured global order. This raises a critical question: what opportunity does this enlargement offer to India?
India as a founding member has consistently viewed BRICS as a platform that aligns with its regional ambitions and its larger pursuit of strategic autonomy. As the twenty-first century continues to unfold as an Asian century, India has been actively pursuing recognition as a great power, beyond its current a middle power status. However, the power dynamics that influenced BRICS at its inception differ distinctly from today’s realities.
At the time of the formation of BRICS, Russia was an erstwhile superpower with considerable geopolitical weight. Both China and India were the emerging powers in Asia, competing geopolitically and economically within Asia and Asia-Pacific region. Over the past decade and a half, however world politics has undergone substantive transformation. Russia is under heavy sanctions for its war in Ukraine by Western states and their allies. China in the meantime has not merely consolidated its great power status but also is increasingly being framed as co-architect of the global order along with the United States. This phase has ushered in two power dynamic at the peak of the world politics and carries echoes resembling a second Cold War.
In this shifting landscape, India has tried to expand and retain its alliances especially in the Indo-Pacific. However, its commitment to strategic autonomy has generated diplomatic constraints. The ongoing reliance of India on Russian energy, specifically crude oil, combined with the visit of President Putin to India in 2025 and Indian abstinences in the United Nations have caused perceptible discomfort among the Western allies. Consequently, the United States, Europe, and other western powers may gradually moderate their expectations from India as a counterweight to China as India is emerging as a more complex and strategically autonomous partner. Additionally, the consistent Indian support to Israel has altered the perceptions among several Muslim-majority countries, including some of its immediate neighbours.
India’s pragmatic, interest-based foreign policy stances has shifted the tectonic plates in international politics. As the dust continues to settle around this more assertive Indian posture, India can make use of BRICS as a viable platform to reassert leadership within the Global South. India’s reasonably positive relations with ASEAN, reinforced by the transition from the “Look East” to a more action-oriented “Act East” policy under Modi Government, provides a significant benefit. India can actively facilitate the integration of newer BRICS members from Southeast Asia through diplomacy, easing their integration into the bloc. By doing so, India can balance out possible imbalance within BRICS where China and Russia disproportionately influence agenda-setting and decision-making.
Shaping BRICS from Within: India’s Strategic Role as a Leader
Being a proponent of multipolarity, India can leverage BRICS to advance a more balanced internal structure. Alongside other founding members like Brazil and South Africa, India can foster an environment where multiple voices shape governance outcomes, thereby restricting the hegemonic propensity within the block. Such an approach aligns with India’s long-standing preference for a pluralistic global order.
Economically, states in ASEAN see BRICS as an opportunity to diversify trade and investment partnerships beyond Western markets and institutions. India has an opportunity to enhance South-South cooperation by promoting greater ASEAN participation, which would simultaneously expand its diplomatic reach and sphere of influence. The expansion of BRICS markets also presents India with the opportunity to promote “Make in India” exports in sectors such as pharmaceuticals.
Furthermore, India could address domestic employment challenges by facilitating skilled mobility across ASEAN members of BRICS economies. Enabling access of talented Indian professionals within BRICS economies could help mitigate the pressures of unemployment while also enhancing people-to-people ties. Enhanced regional connectivity with Southeast Asia would further increase India’s economic and strategic appeal within BRICS.
Nonetheless, challenges persist. Should the Western states slowly gradually adjust their strategic engagement with India, New Delhi may face constraints in sustaining same level of momentum within exclusive minilateral groupings such as Quad and I2U2, platforms that have greatly boosted India’s strategic standing over the past few years. Additionally, China’s economic dominance poses the risk of overshadowing India’s influence within BRICS raising concerns over agenda control and institutional coherence.
Yet, these limitations do not negate the opportunity. With deliberative and strategic approach, India can strengthen economic cooperation while carefully navigating geopolitical tensions, both within the bloc and across the competing foreign policy commitments of its new members. That way, India will be in a position not only to rebrand itself as a powerful actor, but a stabilising leader of the Global South.
Areeba Ahsanat Moazzam is an Assistant Professor and Co-Chair, CoE on Indo-Pacific Studies, School of Liberal Arts and Humanities, Woxsen University, Hyderabad.
Eurasia Review
