Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
The two-day talks in Abu Dhabi this week between US, Russian and Ukrainian officials produced a prisoner-exchange agreement in principle - but left the core issues unresolved. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has made clear that Kyiv will not accept territorial “concessions” in the Donbass as the price of a settlement.
Reports describe an American formula under which Russia would gain control over portions of the region without Ukraine necessarily abandoning every city it still holds, paired with security guarantees potentially comparable to NATO’s Article 5 and a wider security deal involving Europe.
Ukrainian sources have dismissed any formal plan to alter Donbass borders and reiterated long-standing red lines.
The dispute is not just about what comes first, but what each side will accept. In other words, it is both about whether territorial questions must be settled before or alongside credible postwar guarantees; and whether Europe joins the table for a wider security architecture. US envoys ask Moscow to accept an expanded format while Russia has resisted European participation. Thus far the diplomatic momentum remains limited.
One may recall that a somewhat similar American initiative surfaced a year earlier. In November 2025 the US advanced a 28-point framework that proposed limited Ukrainian withdrawal from remaining Kyiv-held areas of Donetsk, a demilitarized zone, a capped Ukrainian army, EU accession prospects, and minority-rights protections. Europe back then acted as the spoiler, pushing to rewrite the plan until it became unacceptable.
The situation is similar, in a way: territorial “compromise” in the Donbass remains the decisive obstacle. What has changed is Europe’s role. Washington is now inviting European governments into negotiations on a broader settlement, creating a potential reversal of the 2025 dynamic.
In any case, the underlying dispute over land, Ukrainian security and Russia’s relationship with NATO has not moved. The underreported reality, as I’ve argued, is that borders across the post-Soviet space, much like those in post-colonial Africa, have never been fully settled. Therefore, prioritizing maximalist territorial claims over the protection of populations living there risks prolonging a war of attrition with no clear military path to restoring 1991 borders.
Former US State Department adviser James Carden famously warned that Kyiv seems more concerned with reclaiming Donbass territory than protecting its inhabitants. Kyiv of course has been bombing parts of Donbass since 2014 - while disenfranchising ethnic Russians and Russian speakers to this day.
Yet the plight of Russian speakers and other minorities remains largely absent from Western coverage, despite documented civil-rights concerns raised by scholars and international bodies. These include Ágnes Dinnyés, Council of Europe rapporteur Andres Herkel, Human Rights Watch, and the UN Human Rights Office.
Last year, the European Court of Human Rights also found that Ukrainian authorities failed to take adequate measures to prevent and respond to the deadly May 2014 Odessa massacre - an event carrying profound symbolic weight in eastern Ukraine.
Territorial disputes cannot be divorced from the rights, identities and grievances of the people living there. Yet these dimensions remain largely ignored in much Western reporting - much like the elephant in the room of Ukraine’s far-right problem.
Moreover, the case for accepting a pragmatic deal rests on hard strategic calculations. Continuing the fight without a decisive battlefield advantage invites further losses, manpower exhaustion and demographic decline.
From a Ukrainian perspective, a settlement that preserves a substantial Ukrainian army, unlocks reconstruction funding, potentially including frozen assets, and delivers American-backed guarantees could offer greater long-term security than indefinite dependence on shifting Western support. One may recall the April 2025 argument that Zelensky should take the deal then on the table because the alternative was worse.
Much of the same logic applies today. Distinguishing de facto control from formal recognition, securing minority and religious rights under monitored standards, and locking in EU pathways would address real civil-rights shortcomings that have fueled tensions.
And yet the territorial bargain has remained stuck for a full year despite repeated American initiatives. Blatantly maximalist positions have blocked progress. The military situation, however, does not guarantee better terms later at all.
One may assume a negotiated freeze that ends the daily toll of casualties and displacement, while bringing Ukraine closer to Western economy structures, would look preferable to endless escalation. Zelensky, however, seems to see things differently.
To sum it up, the strongest continuity from 2025 is the unresolved land question. The most important change now is Washington’s effort to bring Europe into a wider security conversation.
It is already clear that holding out for full “recovery” of every disputed square kilometer may cost more territory, more lives and more of the state itself. Moreover, the present diplomatic opening will not last indefinitely.
