
News.Az presents an interview with Russian political scientist Stanislav Tkachenko, Doctor of Economics and Professor at St. Petersburg State University.
- What are the key reasons why Russia deems it necessary to establish a unified energy strategy for BRICS countries? What advantages could this bring to member states?
- The BRICS countries today represent the primary global center of economic growth. This growth can only be sustained and accelerated if the national economies within the forum are adequately supplied with diverse energy sources for industries, agriculture, service sectors, and households.
During its presidency of the G8 in 2006, Moscow proposed to its partners a comprehensive document addressing energy security. The Russian project consisted of two parts—a Political Declaration and an Action Plan, detailing specific actions for individual states and international organizations to address energy security issues.
Russia prioritized diversifying energy sources, advancing energy-saving technologies, supporting energy-poor countries, safeguarding the environment, and ensuring demand and supply security for energy resources.
Russia's initiatives in 2006 were initially met with coolness and later dismissed by Western leaders, particularly by U.S. politicians and diplomats. This “energy initiative of 2006” ultimately failed, causing Russia to lose interest in the G8, leading to its calm and even relieved exit in 2014. The BRICS format, established in 2009, has since provided Russia with a faster and more effective framework for addressing its energy cooperation concerns at a global level.
I believe the experience from 2006 will be valuable now, as all the earlier suggestions remain relevant and could be addressed within BRICS. Other BRICS countries could benefit from Russia's leadership in implementing an energy strategy since Russia is currently a true energy superpower, and without its cooperation, global energy stability—especially concerning fossil fuels, hydro, and nuclear energy—cannot be assured.
- What role do China and India play in the export of Russian energy resources, and how significant is their growing importance to Russia?
- Currently, these two nations play a crucial role, essentially driving demand for Russian oil in international markets. As of the end of 2023, 90% of Russia's oil exports were directed to major Asian economies: 50% to China and 40% to India. Before sanctions impacted Russian oil around 2022–2023, most Russian oil flowed through Baltic and Black Sea ports to the European Union. Now, however, the geography of exports has shifted significantly. Several hundred tankers from Russia’s “shadow fleet” transport oil from key Russian export terminals in the Arctic, the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Pacific coast to consumers in China and India. Moreover, the major East Siberia–Pacific Ocean pipeline (ESPO), which has a capacity of 58 million tons per year, supplies 20 million tons to China’s northeastern provinces, notably to the city of Daqing.
As for other energy resources, exports of coal to India and natural gas (both pipeline and LNG) to China have experienced rapid growth since 2022. Coal exports peaked in 2023 (100 million tons to China and 28 million tons to India), but in 2024 they are expected to decline by around 18% by year-end. Natural gas exports, however, are less volatile due to limited pipeline capacity, such as through the Power of Siberia pipeline, and the relatively low output at Russia’s few LNG plants.
Experts suggest that the current infrastructure for supplying energy from Russia to China and India is nearly at full capacity. Further expansion will require large-scale investments in transport and logistics infrastructure, though neither the Russian government nor major energy companies have announced any concrete plans for this yet.
- What main challenges did Russia overcome in redirecting energy supplies to Asian countries, and how has this shift impacted its export share to Europe?
- In recent years, Russia had to either build new or significantly modernize its vast energy supply infrastructure for Asian consumers. This had to be accomplished quickly, relying on Russian financing and domestic technologies. Between 2022 and 2024, Russia reaffirmed its status as an energy superpower capable of handling the most complex challenges in the energy sector.
This redirection was a necessity, as Russia was initially reluctant to forgo its established European markets. Moscow was stunned by Europe’s decision to relinquish advantageous oil and gas supplies, setting itself up for increased energy import costs and deindustrialization, particularly in sectors like petrochemicals, metallurgy, fertilizer production, and construction materials. Russian exports to Europe have plummeted in recent years, but, should Western sanctions change, they could be restored relatively quickly. However, there are serious doubts about whether Russia’s largest companies would want to rebind their business futures to Europe, which has, of its own accord, subordinated itself as a junior partner to the U.S., losing its foreign policy autonomy.
- What role does Azerbaijan play in Russia's energy strategy amid the reorientation of energy exports towards Asian markets? Are there any new joint projects being discussed between the countries?
- Currently, Azerbaijan’s role in shaping and implementing Russia’s energy strategy in the medium term (up to 2040) is relatively minor. Facing Western sanctions, Russia has observed as Azerbaijani oil and gas increasingly supply markets in Southern and Eastern Europe, where Russian energy resources used to dominate before the current crisis. The decline in Russian energy production after February 2022 was significant, particularly in natural gas. However, this trend has stabilized, and the sector is now progressing according to its own internal dynamics, with support from reliable foreign partners among Russia’s friendly states.
As far as I am aware, no specific energy cooperation projects are currently under discussion between our countries. In previous years, there was considerable focus on limited electricity exchanges. Russia also showed interest in utilizing the Baku-Tikhoretsk oil pipeline in reverse mode to supply Russian oil into Azerbaijan’s pipeline system for further export to global markets. However, these negotiations have been paused, and any large-scale energy cooperation between our countries is currently on hold.
- Given Azerbaijan’s importance as a transit hub, what are the current plans for expanding the transit of Russian energy resources through Azerbaijani territory?
- At present, Azerbaijan’s developing transit hub is primarily focused on enhancing capacity for trans-Caspian oil shipments and, potentially, natural gas exports westward across the Caspian Sea to Türkiye and the Mediterranean region. These projects do not directly involve Russia, although certain Russian energy and transport companies may participate on a limited scale. For Russian gas supplies, the South Stream and TurkStream pipelines have been built, and challenging negotiations are underway regarding Russia's potential involvement in the Turkish gas hub. Russian oil is delivered to Türkiye in small quantities via tankers, and no significant changes are expected in these supplies.
- How could the establishment of a unified energy strategy for BRICS countries impact Russia-Azerbaijan energy cooperation if Azerbaijan joins this bloc?
- It’s premature to predict the prospects for adopting and implementing a unified BRICS energy strategy. This would be a complex process, requiring a single framework that balances the interests of both energy producers and consumers within the BRICS countries. Current projections suggest that by 2050, BRICS countries will produce and consume at least 50% of the world’s energy. It is essential for BRICS to begin building a flexible, multi-industry energy market supported by technology and capital, free from monopolies and sanctions.
The lessons from the West’s current sanctions against Russia have prompted many BRICS nations to move away from using the U.S. dollar in energy transactions, reduce reliance on British insurance services, and lessen technological dependency on major Western firms producing sophisticated equipment for energy extraction and processing.
Whether Azerbaijan’s involvement in these processes aligns with its national interests will be decided by your country’s leadership and its people. I believe that, in the initial stages, BRICS will likely assume some of the market stabilization functions currently managed within OPEC+. Azerbaijan is well-acquainted with this platform and has the experience needed to evaluate the potential benefits of energy cooperation with BRICS countries.
News.Az