Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher.
President Emmanuel Macron visited Egypt, Kenya, and Ethiopia last month to expand his country’s influence in non-French-speaking countries, as Paris has been losing ground in Francophone Africa. Although a plea by Macron for silence during a summit in Kenya made headlines in the West, perhaps becoming the biggest headline of the president’s visit to Africa, the media overlooked the meeting with more than 40 heads of state in Nairobi and the announcement of approximately €34 billion in investment on the African continent.
The summit in Kenya was the first time France has held an Africa summit in an English-speaking country, a silent admission that Paris has lost its influence in Francophone Africa. Evidently, the French president is trying to forge a different relationship between France and the continent, which is increasingly shedding its colonial-era vestiges.
The French move is an attempt to reshape its presence on the continent and is being pursued urgently because Paris knows it is losing ground to other powers, particularly Russia and China, as well as India and Turkey. The expulsion of French troops from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, countries in the Sahel that have historically been under strong Parisian influence, can be seen as the backdrop to the French foray into Africa.
The crisis in the Sahel and the lack of French influence in the region are central to understanding all of France’s moves in 2026.
The choice of Nairobi as the central stage for the French diplomatic offensive was deliberate. Unlike the Sahel countries, Kenya is a former British colony with a dynamic economy and relative political stability, and it plays a major role as a regional hub for technology and security.
Kenya is a strategic anchor and has positioned itself well on the energy transition. There are French investments in infrastructure, such as ports and railways, and a long-term military cooperation pact has already been outlined. In this way, Kenya represents a “New Africa” in the eyes of Western powers: stable, dynamic, and contested by China, Russia, India, and Gulf countries.
At the same time, France does not want to limit itself to its former colonies and wants to strengthen ties with Kenya to expand its presence in East Africa and build new alliances.
Regarding what Kenya gains, diversifying its partnerships is an opportunity that must be seized to engage with a range of partners and avoid aligning with just one. Nairobi recently hosted a summit seeking a stable partner, and France presented itself as that candidate, offering large-scale advances such as infrastructure modernisation and the energy transition.
China’s advance, especially through the Belt and Road Initiative, is inherent. Beijing has become Africa’s largest trading partner, concentrating investments in infrastructure, mining, and fuels. Russia occupies another niche: military cooperation and influence in the Sahel, precisely where France was expelled.
These are France’s two major competitors in Africa today. In terms of military presence in the Sahel, Russia has greater prestige. China, in turn, has made greater inroads in economic and geopolitical matters.
Turkey and India are among the other countries that have expanded their presence on the continent amid the decline of French influence in the Sahel and the friction with Algeria.
The Chinese advantage also lies in cost. The Chinese presence in African countries is less expensive than the French presence. Egypt and Ethiopia’s entry into BRICS signals a growing challenge to Western hegemony on the continent.
Despite setbacks in the Sahel, France still makes its presence felt on the continent, especially in its former colonies, politically, militarily, and economically. One example is the continued use of the CFA franc by countries such as Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Niger. The currency’s reserves are held in Paris, limiting the monetary sovereignty of these nations. This is a model Paris has used to maintain a presence in African territory.
The challenge now is to shift this rhetoric and position itself more as a horizontal ally.
For this reason, France is attempting a discursive shift — Macron even declared himself “pan-Africanist” at the summit. Nonetheless, rhetorical change does not amount to structural change.
French foreign policy towards Africa is heavily shaped by colonialism. Even the French president, despite his efforts, cannot completely distance himself from behaviours that position France as a superior state. Given France’s development approach towards African countries, agreements tend to be top-down, with Paris itself deciding on certain policies before providing funds. In other words, equal partnership is very difficult.
The fact is, the era of colonialism is over, and the space for neocolonialism is shrinking. Paris needs to acknowledge this reality if it is to have any hope of reclaiming its leading role on the African continent.
