By Krishnan Srinivasan and Manoj Mohanka

Nehru once said that India and China working together could introduce an Asian golden age. The same thought was echoed by Singapore’s first prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in saying that China with one wing and India with another could make the bird of Asia fly. We need to ask if the present leaders in China and India harbour any such thoughts. On the contrary, India and China have for past decades been locked in competition in South and Southeast Asia, largely to China’s advantage even among India’s closest neighbours.

It would be unrealistic to assess India and China in the weighing scales. Since the Nehru/Lee era, India and China have grown more distant with relations askew. China is a global power; India a global player. China looms large in India’s strategic planning; the converse is untrue. In trade, Indian’s exports to China are about $18 billion a year with imports being about $ 127 billion. Th total Chinese investment in India is $2.7 billion or 0.3% of total foreign inward investment – a miniscule figure for China that has $162 billion invested abroad. There are about 5-7,000 Chinese in India and perhaps 55,000 Indians in China, which includes Hongkong (with 45,000) and Taiwan. These are hardly figures that support a robust bilateral relationship.

India-China reset

Reports that India is prepared for a reset in bilateral relations with China after the Modi-Xi meetings at Kazan (2024) and Tianjin last year are welcome. The desirability of good relations with China, a major Asian and world economy and influence, should speak for itself, quite apart from any external considerations. But there seems to be a great deal of Indian hesitation, probably due to strong pro-US and anti-China lobbies in India. This is resulting in one step forward and one back which is not only confusing but reveals a lack of clarity and determination in Delhi.

To cite a few examples: India is still not granting visas easily to Chinese visitors, though this may finally be being addressed; but a decision on extending e-visa facilities which can be a game changer is still pending, Non-issues like the Chinese naming of parts of India are blown out of proportion. Not all these irritants are caused by India by any means, but they are magnified by a prejudiced media which is not countered by any pro-China lobby in India, and this inherited hostility towards China causes great imbalance.

The same stop-go attitude, which strains credibility, of India towards China is seen in the issue of facilitating inward investment by China in India. It seems that over-cautious advocates and sceptics about China always have the upper hand in India. Seen objectively, at a time when India is crying out for investment in manufacturing, export-oriented industries and state-of-art technology, such impediments defy comprehension.Investment by neighbours (example China) requires prior government permission.

This is now promised within two months. Lately 10% Chinese ownership is also permitted. These inducements are hardly of any great attraction for a nation that has invested $162 billion abroad, mainly in infrastructure and energy. India should consider creating a sector-specific green channel where India could allow higher Chinese investment in climate technology (ev batteries, solar) while insisting on local R&D centres which could move the needle into large Chinese investments and give India access to technology in an area where it is behind.

India should note that China spent 1.7 to 2% of its GDP over three decades to support industry and ensure competitiveness. India should learn from this; for the first time in five years there was recently an Indian trade delegation in Shanghai. However, India apparently still prizes protection over exports, when it should play to its labour strength and build scale in assembly before chasing the chimera of self-reliance.

Evidently, India does not seek to provide any enabling environment for the Chinese, although symbolism and signals are important in Asia. At the WTO in April, India cast the sole veto on a Chinese proposal ‘Investment Facilitation for Development’ backed by 128 countries.

There is no effort to attract Chinese tourists (which number more than 100 million a year) to India. At present only between 30 and 40,000 tourists from China visit India annually. Chinese business people still face difficulties in obtaining Indian visas.

BRICS

There was hope that India’s chairmanship of BRICS this year would provide a platform for enhanced economic contact. India has an opportunity as the 2026 BRICS chair to further normalise relations with China. Both nations are engaging in diplomatic dialogue and China has signalled support for India’s BRICS presidency, suggesting enhanced cooperation and normalization of relations even as border challenges persist.

But India has a basic problem in BRICS, which is that of the five original and leading members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) before recent expansion, only India has a tolerant, supportive attitude towards the US and dollar denominated trade. This puts it at risk of isolation at the upcoming BRICS summit at Delhi. BRICS members like Russia, China South Africa and Iran, are likely to have widely divergent views from India on US and Israel’s illegal aggression against Iran. India so far ignored Iran’s appeals to summon an urgent meeting of BRICS to discuss the Iran war and displays no urgency; BRICS foreign ministers are only to meet in May, the same month ironically as India hosts QUAD foreign ministers – an organization to which China is openly hostile.

Yet there might be some opportunities to improve relations with China via BRICS:

- As BRICS 2026 chair, India will host various meetings covering trade, technology and security, creating a structured environment for more economic engagement.

- India and China are focused on stabilisation, with high-level officials highlighting that the strengthening of coordination within BRICS can foster better ties.

- Both nations share common interests in strengthening multilateralism, promoting a multipolar world and improving economic cooperation, which can serve as a foundation to manage their bilateral friction points, such as the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

But there are challenges as well.

- Border Tensions: While diplomatic engagement is increasing, the unresolved border along the LAC remains a major challenge. India could propose a digital LAC, using shared satellite /sensor data to prevent future misunderstandings and stand offs.

- India’s membership of Quad, a group designed to counter Chinese influence, contrasts with China’s goals in BRICS, creating a complex relationship where cooperation and competition co-exist. Quad and BRICS need not be a zero sum game – Quad being maritime security and BRICS representing economic multipolaity.

- The Way Ahead: The success of BRICS relies on whether the two nations can align their interests, transforming their “partly convergent and partly divergent” relationship into a more stable partnership.

India’s BRICS leadership could offer a forum to enhance ties with China, provided India can remove inherited mind-set and show strategic flexibility by utilising multilateral cooperation to manage bilateral disputes and enhance mutual cooperation.

Krishnan Srinivasan is a former foreign secretary, Government of India & Manoj Mohanka serves on the Board of several corporates and think tanks.

The Wire