By Alena Lisenkova
The priorities of South Africa’s foreign policy in recent years seemed clear: the development of new platforms for multilateral cooperation (such as BRICS+), advocating its own interests, and increasing its presence in international institutions, as well as promoting multipolarity. These established priorities have remained constant due to the uninterrupted rule of the African National Congress (ANC) since 1994, when Nelson Mandela became president and the apartheid system fell. However, the results of the 2024 parliamentary elections have, for the first time, seriously called into question the continuation of this established order. The ANC no longer holds an absolute majority in both houses of parliament. This has forced it to seek coalition partners. A little over a year after the formation of the Government of National Unity, one can attempt to answer the question: has the country’s foreign policy agenda changed?
It’s worth noting that this isхот not the first time that South Africa has been governed by more than one party. Even in Nelson Mandela’s cabinet (1994-1999), the ANC formed a coalition with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and even with the ruling National Party during the apartheid era (though only until 1996). However, this time the situation is far more serious, although by and large nothing surprising has happened. The rivalry between the African National Congress and the Democratic Alliance (DA) has been ongoing since the 1990s. Even in their most successful campaigns, other parties have barely surpassed 10%. The current exception is the uMkhonto weSizwe (“Spear of the Nation”), but its popularity rests on the authority of veteran South African politician Jacob Zuma, President of South Africa from 2009 to 2018. Meanwhile, the DA, since 1994, has almost always improved upon its previous election results. The only exception was in 2019, when its leading candidate was a non-white politician (importantly, though, is that the Democratic Alliance and its predecessors are not the successors to the apartheid-era National Party). The ANC, on the other hand, has been performing progressively worse since 2009. Moreover, according to polls, support for the African National Congress in 2025 (40.18% in the elections) remains at around 40%, while the Democratic Alliance’s support has risen from 21.81% to 26%. This fuels interest in the outcome of the 2029 campaign.
Importantly, the two parties in the current cabinet are strikingly different in their foreign policy priorities. The African National Congress aims to establish the African Continental Free Trade Area, do work in the Southern African Development Community, strengthen the country’s positions in multilateral institutions (BRICS+, G20, etc.), develop relations with Iran, express its solidarity with the people of Palestine (lawsuit against Israel in the International Court of Justice), and cooperate on global issues (climate change, etc.), including the issue of illegal migration in various platforms. Meanwhile, the liberal-oriented Democratic Alliance emphasises socioeconomic development and cooperation with the US and EU, it is reluctant to move closer to Russia (supporting Ukraine and calling for the implementation of International Criminal Court decisions) and China, maintains close relations with Taiwan, and holds pro-Israel sentiments.
Clearly, the differences are fundamental. There is a gap between the desire for multipolarity and the gravitation toward a pro-Western development scenario. The problem is fuelled by key opposition forces – the Spear of the Nation and Fighters for Economic Freedom parties. These socialist-minded parties are opposed to the exploitative neoliberal system and are members of the Progressive Wing opposition coalition. If DA, in their worldview, panders to the West, then the ANC, as it turns out, can be blamed – for making concessions to a junior coalition partner.
However, the standard procedure for legislative decisions in the country still presupposes the consent of a majority of the National Assembly delegates. Therefore, on the one hand, the African National Congress has succeeded in forming a government, allowing Cyril Ramaphosa to seek another presidential term. In the spirit of Ubuntu philosophy, the government has outlined its commitment to overcoming the historical polarisation of society and achieving national priorities. The coalition is not limited to the competing ANC and DA, but also aims to include various forces (for example, the PSI, which is highly sought after by ethnic Zulus). Both racial and ethnic factors play a significant role in South Africa.
On the other hand, achieving unity, even among the dominant players, is not easy. Ultimately, such a coalition, within which consensus is required for decision-making, is a political union that retains significant ideological differences, elements of competition, and relies on diverse electorates. This collaboration was made possible largely by the ANC’s strong desire to retain power and the DA’s aspiration to enter government. It was also determined by the results of both parties in 2024, which made sole governance by the African National Congress impossible. Collaboration with former ANC leader Zuma’s third-place Spear of the Nation (14.58%) was ruled out, and other potential combinations would have led to excessive party fragmentation in government. Consequently, the Statement of Intent of the Government of National Unity, published on June 14, 2024, merely abstractly reflects foreign policy priorities with references to human rights, justice, multilateralism, peaceful dispute resolution, and other principles for South-South and North-South cooperation and the achievement of Agenda 2063. This takes into account the interests of both the ANC and the DA; it also reflects the classic set of priorities for an African country mired in crime, poverty, racism, energy shortages, and so on.
Although a number of ministries were lost to the DA and others, in practice, the ANC’s dominance in foreign affairs has been maintained, including through control over the relevant ministry and the most represented parliamentary delegation. Thus, in particular, already in February 2025, Ramaphosa delivered his traditional address to the nation. It clearly maintained the previous foreign policy priorities: multilateralism (G20, African Union, Non-Aligned Movement, BRICS, etc.), a focus on Africa, justice, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, the peaceful settlement of disputes (including in Ukraine), and inclusive reform of the UN Security Council. In line with the government’s Medium-Term Development Plan, the emphasis was again on participation in global processes and, in particular, on the G20 presidency and consultations with BRICS+ partners.
In practice, in October 2024, Cyril Ramaphosa attended the BRICS summit in Kazan, and at a personal meeting with Vladimir Putin, he noted: “We consider Russia a very valuable ally and friend.” In August 2025, the head of South Africa was among the leaders whom the Russian president contacted after his meeting with Donald Trump in Alaska. In September 2025, already at an extraordinary online summit, Ramaphosa stated: “South Africa will support BRICS initiatives to strengthen the economies of member states and the Global South. We also support the reforms proposed by BRICS members (note: regarding the WTO) with the aim of increasing the sustainability of the international multilateral system.” Finally, South Africa holds the G20 presidency from the end of 2024, where it once again prioritises advancing the interests of the African continent and the Global South as a whole.
However, as with the 2023 BRICS summit in Johannesburg, it is highly likely that Vladimir Putin will not attend the G20 meeting in November 2025, also scheduled for South Africa.
Despite the position of the African National Congress, the Democratic Alliance (DA) views the rapprochement between the two countries negatively, and in 2023 it already insisted on the implementation of the International Criminal Court’s controversial verdict against the Russian leader.
However, the DA continues to support the EU’s continued status as the world’s largest trading partner, as well as significant European investment. In 2025 alone, the Global Gateway project announced an allocation of €4.7 billion, the majority of which will go toward developing green energy. Similar initiatives have been launched before, clearly demonstrating the discrepancies in the country’s diplomatic and economic instruments, but also engendering compromise between the two parties. Other existing differences also surface from time to time. For example, already in late 2024, while in office, Leon Schreiber, the DA Minister of the Interior, announced his intention to grant visa-free travel to Ukrainian officials. The initiative was harshly criticised by the ANC.
Thus, South Africa’s foreign policy has become limited in its manoeuvrability. The cooperation between the African National Congress, which for the first time failed to secure an absolute majority, and its recent bitter rival, the Democratic Alliance, can be described as a reluctant partnership. Coalition crises are inevitable, but it is premature to talk about a collapse, and it is impossible to predict whether it will last until 2029. It is also worth recognising that citizens facing a host of socioeconomic problems are not particularly interested in foreign policy, so such an alliance is, in principle, possible. This saves the ratings of the Democratic Alliance, which is forced to give in, and defending its largely pro-Western ambitions, being a junior partner and located in a country of the Global South, is very problematic.
Discussing the foreign policy orientations of African countries is crucial as new multilateral cooperation formats emerge and major players seek ways to increase their global presence. For such countries, including the Russian Federation, the question remains pressing: where will South Africa go from here?
Alena Lisenkova is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of International Studies at MGIMO University and the Faculty of International Relations at St. Petersburg State University.
Valdai Discussion Club
The views in the article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of InfoBRICS.
