By Sergey Semenov& Nikita Shutyak
A discussion of the problem of WMD terrorism in the context of BRICS enlargement may not seem obviously relevant. Cooperation to counter this type of the terror threat is not among the bloc’s current priorities. The last time the issue was mentioned at all was in the final declaration of the BRICS summit in 2016, when the five nations welcomed India’s initiative to hold a conference on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in 2018.
Nevertheless, terrorism remains a pressing problem for all BRICS members. The BRICS Counterterrorism Strategy prioritizes international cooperation in countering the terror threat. The practical side of such cooperation – such as information sharing between the secret services of the countries involved – usually happens in secret. Also, the strategy may involve harmonization of national approaches to the problem of terrorism.
Naturally, cooperation in combating terrorism cannot be limited by the current five BRICS members as it requires a joint effort with as many partners as possible. Such an effort cannot and should not be made conditional on BRICS enlargement or any other political considerations. That is why countering terrorism (and especially WMD terrorism) will be part of the acquis communautaire in the process of BRICS enlargement – but it will not be at the top of the enlargement agenda.
Unlike the other sections of this report, the current section does not focus on the potential contribution of each membership candidate to the problem at hand (countering terrorism, in this instance). It makes more sense to consider Argentina, Mexico, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, and Indonesia as a representative sample that highlights the needs of the entire international community in terms of combating WMD terrorism. Such an analysis can them be used to outline the shape of future BRICS cooperation on the problem of terrorism with a much broader range of international partners.
Of course, focusing only on WMD terrorism rather than the broader terror threat artificially limits the scope of this report. We regard such a focus as a useful way to stimulate a discussion on engaging other nations in counterterrorism cooperation in the BRICS framework, and we deliberately use the issue of WMD as a pilot for such a discussion. Further debate on this subject would require the involvement of the broader expert community in Russia and the other BRICS member states.
GICNT and others
Most of the international effort to combat WMD terrorism is taking place in the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the IAEA, and other multilateral instruments. The International Convention Against Acts of Chemical and Biological Terrorism proposed by Russia at the Conference on Disarmament in 2016 could become another useful addition to that list.
Of the potential BRICS membership candidates discussed in this paper, only Argentina, Mexico, and Turkey already participate in the GICNT, whereas Iran, Egypt, and Indonesia have yet to join. Three working groups have been established in the GICNT framework: on nuclear forensics, on nuclear detection, and on emergency response and relief. All three groups develop recommendations and conduct practical events such as work - shops, tabletop and field exercises, training sessions, etc.
Argentina and Mexico stand out for their active involvement in field training exercises on the prevention of nuclear terrorism. In 2019, Argentina conducted the Pampa Knife nuclear security demonstration training event, which showcased effective coordination between the emergency response services and technical specialists in dealing with a simulated terror attacks involving the use of nuclear or radioactive materials during a mass public gathering event. In 2017, Argentina and Chile conducted the Paihuen II tabletop exercise to improve bilateral protocols of response to the threat of nucle - ar terrorism, the first such event since the Paihuen I in 2014.
Mexico held the Jaguar Negro national field training exercise in 2018. It also hosted a meeting of a GICNT working group in Ocoyoacac and Mexico City. The goal of those exercises was to strengthen regional cooperation during emergencies, including joint efforts in the area of radiological forensics; improve liaison protocols; and develop an effective cooperation process for investigating terror attacks involving the use of nuclear or other radioactive materials.
Mexico is also actively involved in nuclear security-related efforts in the IAEA framework. The country follows IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. It participates in IAEA technical meetings on developing recommendations for imports and exports of nuclear and radiological materials. It also hosted a visit by experts of the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) to review the measures being taken against the threat of nuclear terrorism and improve a broad range of actions on nuclear security. The recommendations issued by IPPAS are used to prepare the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan.
Turkey also makes a notable contribution to the IAEA-led effort on nuclear security. It participates in technical meetings on nuclear security, such as “Preventive and Protective Measures Against Insider Threats at Nuclear Facilities”, “Nuclear Security Management for Research Reactors and the Related Infrastructure”, and “Computer Security”.
Egypt signed an Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan with the IAEA on November 27, 2014. The plan aims to strengthen multilateral cooperation on nuclear security. Egypt and the IAEA also cooperate on improving physical protection systems of the country’s two research reactors.
All the potential BRICS membership candidates reviewed in this paper comply with the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. All six countries have criminalized unauthorized access to and the use of WMD.
Useful information about the BRICS membership candidates’ requirements in terms of combating the threat of nuclear terrorism is also contained in the Nuclear Security Index published by the Nuclear Threat Initiative. According to that index, the most vulnerable states in terms of the preparedness of their security and emergency response services are Iran and Egypt (which score 5 and 26 points, respectively, on a 100-point scale). But other membership candidates also have a lot of room for improvement as far as their emergency response systems are concerned. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the greatest contribution to strengthening nuclear security can be made by improving background checks during the hiring of personnel at sensitive facilities, strengthening regulatory capacity, improving resilience to cyberattacks, and strengthening the security culture. Even though the scoring methodology used in the NTI Index is not perfect, we believe that cooperation between these states and the existing BRICS members would be very useful in terms of combating the threat of nuclear terrorism.
BRICS as an integrator of global counterterrorism efforts
The BRICS nations have long called for the signing of a comprehensive convention on combating international terrorism. In their opinion, such an instrument would put an end to the dispersal of the counterterrorism agenda across multiple different platforms, which inevitably hinders the focusing of the international community’s effort to defeat this evil facing every country on the planet. BRICS could well serve as an integrator of the efforts of different countries and alliances in this area, helping to universalize the existing instruments and find common ground. At the same time, there should be no illusions: the existing differences between various countries run so deep that a comprehensive convention on combating terrorism is not something that can be achieved any time soon. But that only makes all the more relevant the potential unifying role of BRICS – a role that bloc can play thanks to its truly unique membership.
BRICS counterterrorism efforts would augment the activities undertaken in the existing frameworks such as the Regional Counterterrorism Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which three of the five BRICS nations are also members. We believe that the five BRICS nations are capable of taking the experience and mechanisms of cooperation between Eurasian states to the global level.
The need for such an integrator is clearly demonstrated by the problem of WMD terrorism. Many nations remain outside the GICNT and are not involved in the sharing of best practices in countering this type of the terror threat. Let us also recall that the United States has tried to become an integrator of the international community’s efforts in combating nuclear terrorism. As part of those attempts, the Obama administration held a series of nuclear security summits that were attended by all the BRICS membership candidates discussed in this paper, except for Iran. The United States is also working to strengthen cooperation in this area in the bilateral framework.
It cannot be ruled out that under the new Democratic administration, Washington will try to resurrect the nuclear security summit series. But BRICS has one clear advantage over the United States: cooperation in the BRICS framework is devoid of the element of US mentorship. It is pursued as a join effort of equal partners, without any attempts by the “leader” to foist any behavioral models on its “followers”. That side of the reputation BRICS has earned for itself on the international arena could be very attractive for the developing states. As a case in point, it would be very hard to imagine Iran agreeing to take part in such cooperation with the United States – but cooperation between Iran and BRICS would be entirely realistic.
Sergey Semyonov - coordinator of the PIR Center program “Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation”, Nikita Shutyak - PIR Center intern, master’s student at MGIMO University.
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CONCLUSION
Should we view the possibility of BRICS enlargement as an opportunity, or as a burden?
On the one hand, the prevailing idea that the BRICS club should first be allowed to settle down with its current membership is entirely rational. But on the other, without such enlargement, BRICS will inevitably lose its forward momentum and global attraction. The additions of new members cannot and should not be a frequent occurrence; that would be counterproductive. But it has already been quite a long time since the accession of South Africa back in 2011, which turned the BRIC bloc into BRICS. It has already been long enough to consider another round of enlargementprovided that there is a strong financial, economic, and geopolitical case for it, and that none of the existing BRICS members are opposed to the idea.
We are aware that the expansion of the BRICS in the near future could be а too radical step to insist on. Therefore, in this report, we generally avoid the recommendation for 2021 and try to speak in the context of the mid-term perspective.
Another important issue to consider is regional representation. We believe that offering membership to Southeast Asian, Middle Eastern, or North African states (or state) would make it possible to strengthen relations with those regions and secure their greater support at the UN and other international venues.
A review of the security priorities of the potential membership candidates suggests that BRICS as a bloc would especially benefit from securing new partnerships on countering such emerging international challenges as terrorism, organized crime, cyberthreats, and drug trafficking. Fostering closer cooperation with states that are leaders in their respective regions would significantly expand the international “support group” for the approaches to dealing with these problems advocated by BRICS.
The benefits of BRICS enlargement are not quite as obvious in such areas as peaceful nuclear energy and space programs. That situation will certainly change at some point in the future – but for now, it would make more sense to pursue closer cooperation in these areas between the five current members. At present, BRICS cooperation on space programs is in the very early phases, and on peaceful nuclear energy, the bloc has only just recently recognized the need for such cooperation. An overhasty enlargement would only make it more difficult to forge closer ties in these areas for the existing members. As for the future, once the BRICS nations have fleshed out their cooperation plans and moved on to concrete projects, it would make better sense not to focus too much on any single membership candidate, and to pursue engagement in the BRICS-Plus and Outreach format with multiple partners instead.
For all the reasons outlined above, we believe that Indonesia appears to be the most promising candidate for BRICS membership in the medium term. The country pursues a balanced and thoughtful policy on key international security issues. It also commands a lot of respect in the Islamic world and the Nonaligned Movement. If Jakarta and BRICS were to coordinate their positions, it would help BRICS to promote its approaches more effectively in the international arena. And even though Indonesia is not at the top of the global rankings on many indicators, we believe that the country’s accession to BRICS would be the least controversial.
Thanks to Indonesia’s impressive economic growth rates, its accession to BRICS would also help the bloc to reinforce its positions as the leading engine of global economic growth, as well as its standing at the international financial institutions. If Indonesia were to become a member, BRICS would control over 15 per cent of the votes on the IMF Board – enough to block decisions that run counter to the club’s interests.
There are also several political factors that favor Indonesia’s accession. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the addition of new members would inevitably make it more difficult for the bloc to reach a consensus on various issues. Even with its current membership of five, BRICS does not always stand united on some international issues. Neither is it clear how a potential enlargement would affect cooperation with external partners in the Outreach and BRICS-Plus format. There are risks of stoking up the existing tensions between the current members, especially India and China. For example, New Delhi views Beijing’s enthusiasm for the BRICS-Plus format as an attempt to dilute India’s clout and use BRICS as an engine for the Belt and Road Initiative.
We believe that the opportunities offered by the current five-nation membership of the BRICS bloc have yet to be exhausted. As for the benefits offered by BRICS enlargement, many if not most of them can be gained by pursuing cooperation in other formats that stop short of a full membership.
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