Southeast Asia and nuclear power

Since the advent of commercial nuclear power in the mid-1950s, Southeast Asian countries have considered adding atomic power to their energy mix. Indonesia established the region's first nuclear power agency in 1958. Thailand had begun operating the region's first research reactor in 1962. Vietnam established its first American-supplied research reactor in 1961, later rebuilt and expanded in 1984 with Soviet help. Malaysia's first and only research reactor achieved criticality, meaning a normal, stable operating state, in 1982. The Philippines completed Southeast Asia's first nuclear power plant (NPP) in 1984, though it was never fueled.

To date, Southeast Asia's aspirations to generate atomic power never came to fruition, mainly due to the high costs of building and operating NPPs and safety concerns. From the late 2010s, however, four factors have driven governments across the region to once again give serious consideration to nuclear power: 1) Increasing demand for electricity to meet the needs of industry (particularly data centers and semiconductor plants) and growing urban populations; 2) Commitments to achieve net zero carbon emissions by 2050–2060; 3) Mitigating energy insecurity in light of recent supply chains disruptions; and 4) The promise of new nuclear technologies, specifically small modular reactors (SMRs).

There is no shortage of interest from foreign nuclear suppliers in partnering with Southeast Asian nations. Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines have signed "123 Agreements," which refer to Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, with the United States for the safe development of peaceful nuclear cooperation including technical exchanges, scientific research, safeguards discussions, and transfers of nuclear technologies. But the US private sector lags far behind international competitors in innovation, especially Russia's State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom and China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), both state-owned companies. In choosing a partner, or partners, governments must weigh a complex array of factors, including geopolitical sensitivities, costs and financing, technology transfer, and training programs.

Russia in Southeast Asia

Given Rosatom's dominant position in the global nuclear technology market, it is unsurprising that Russia has stolen a march on its nuclear competitors in Southeast Asia. Rosatom is the only company in the world to offer all technologies involved in the nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining to enrichment, construction, operation, and waste management and disposal. As of 2026, it had the largest foreign project portfolio, with 41 projects in 11 countries. The company offers generous financing covering up to 85% of construction costs and is the only corporation to have won an overseas order for an SMR.

Since the mid-2010s, Rosatom has signed memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and other agreements with six Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Rosatom also has collaborative partnerships with Thai research bodies and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Centre for Energy. These agreements cover a range of cooperative activities, including the establishment of information centers to promote public awareness of nuclear power, education and personnel training, the supply of research reactors, and the construction of NPPs including both conventional nuclear plants and SMRs.

Vietnam

In the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union helped Vietnam expand and activate a nuclear research reactor first built in the Da Lat highlands by the US in 1961. However, it was not until the mid-2000s that Hanoi announced plans to acquire NPPs by the early 2030s, aiming to have the first two built in Ninh Thuan province on the southeastern coast. Vietnam and Russia have longstanding political, economic, and security ties dating back to the Cold War and a shared ideological history, so it was unsurprising Hanoi turned to Moscow for assistance.

In 2010, the two countries signed an agreement for the construction of two conventional pressurized water reactors for Ninh Thuan 1. In addition to pledging a US$8 billion-loan to cover 85% of the construction costs, Russia agreed to build a Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology (CNST) in Hanoi and provide training for hundreds of Vietnamese nuclear technicians in Russia. Both initiatives carried on despite a temporary suspension of the Ninh Thuan project in 2016. This proved to be an astute decision on Russia's part, as To Lam, who became Vietnam's General Secretary in 2024, revived the Ninh Thuan project to support his ambitions plans for the country's economy.

Myanmar

Myanmar is the second Southeast Asian country to sign an agreement with Russia for the supply of an NPP and only the second in the world to opt for a Russian SMR. But due to the pariah status of the military regime, which seized power in February 2021 after six years of civilian rule, an ongoing civil war, and suspicions that the ultimate aim of Myanmar's paranoid generals is to acquire atomic bombs, Russia's nuclear cooperation with Myanmar is highly controversial.

Russia has played a key role in Myanmar's civilian nuclear program for more than two decades. In 2002 and 2007, Rosatom signed MOUs with the junta for the supply of a research reactor (which was never delivered) and training programs for Myanmar technicians at Russia's nuclear institutions. The civilian government, which held power between 2015 and 2021, shelved plans for an NPP but after seizing power again in February 2021, the military quickly reactivated them due to a severe energy crisis triggered by the outbreak of civil war in the aftermath of the coup.

Indonesia

Indonesia has ambitious plans to harness nuclear power for achieving economic growth while at the same time remaining committed to its net-zero carbon emissions target by 2060. To meet those goals, the government plans to add 100 GW of power by 2040, with 10% generated from nuclear energy. It is estimated that this will require the construction of up to 20 NPPs with the first one in operation by the early 2030s. Due to Rosatom's full nuclear life-cycle packages and the Kremlin's excellent relations with the country's political elite, Russia has enough for a foothold in Indonesia's nuclear industry.

Jakarta and Moscow have been discussing nuclear power cooperation for over a decade. In 2015, only a year after nuclear energy was formally included in the country's national energy policy, Indonesia's National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) and Rosatom signed an MOU which included supplying a research reactor and a floating nuclear power plant. Russia, however, is not the only game in town. As with other aspects of Indonesia's trade, defense, and procurement policies, the country seeks a diversity of suppliers to avoid overdependence on a single source. Hence, Indonesia has discussed nuclear cooperation with companies from the US, Japan, Canada, South Korea, and China, which Russia likely would have to contend with.

China and Southeast Asia

Over the past few decades, China has developed one of the world's most advanced nuclear power industries. China has 60 NPPs in operation and 29 either planned or under construction. Although it lags far behind Russia in exports of nuclear technology, China has ambitions to become the world's "undefeated nuclear champion" by mid-century. Its ambitions are primarily focused on exporting NPPs to the nearly 150 countries that have signed MOUs with China to participate in its global economic and infrastructure strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In offering its nuclear services to other countries, China has taken a leaf out of Russia's playbook in terms of full-cycle services and loan structure. Unlike Rosatom, however, CNNC has struggled to attract interest from overseas buyers, with the exception of Pakistan. While Russia has signed multiple nuclear cooperation agreements with six Southeast Asian countries, China has concluded only three. There are four possible reasons for this.

First, Russia is likely seen by some regional states as a more reliable partner than China due to its long track record as a supplier of NPPs to overseas customers. In the cases of Vietnam and Myanmar, Russia also has a closer working relationship with the countries' political leaders.

Second, China's expansive territorial and jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea almost rule China out of the running in some Southeast Asian countries, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines. While maritime territorial disputes with China may be of less concern to Indonesia and Malaysia, they nevertheless would factor in any calculus on a subject as sensitive as nuclear energy.

Third, a reluctance to acquire long-term Chinese debt lingers among developing nations, given that in the past Beijing has used foreign debt to gain ownership of strategic assets such as ports in BRI-participant countries such as Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

The fourth reason concerns China's own energy priorities. To meet its net zero carbon emissions target and rising energy demand (forecasted to peak by 2030), China's focus so far has been on growing its nuclear industry at home to meet domestic demand. From the 2030s, however, the focus may switch to developing overseas markets, a timeline that fits well with Southeast Asia's nuclear power plans.

While Russia remains ahead of China in the export portfolio for Southeast Asia, Beijing is adept at playing the long game. Its technological innovation in the sector and strategic alliance with Russia may yet challenge Rosatom's global nuclear dominance in the next few decades, if not years.

Hinrich Foundation