By Lin Minwang
At the beginning of 2024, BRICS officially expanded its membership. In view of the century-old changes, the large-scale expansion of BRICS cooperation mechanism is of great strategic significance. This enlargement has basically incorporated the major developing countries within the G20 into the BRICS cooperation mechanism, prompting many major developing countries to shift the focus of multilateral cooperation from the G20 to BRICS cooperation. Moreover, the BRICS cooperation mechanism has brought in many regional powers with international influence at the same time, further enhancing its appeal and influence in the global South.
India is one of the most important members of the BRICS cooperation mechanism, second only to China in terms of economic size. India has played a very positive role in promoting the development of the BRICS cooperation mechanism in the past. However, with the fundamental changes in India's foreign affairs and internal affairs in recent years, India has gradually become a negative factor and hindering force in the BRICS cooperation mechanism, which has also led to the rise of differences and contradictions within the BRICS cooperation mechanism. At the same time, the discord in bilateral relations between China and India has been brought into the BRICS cooperation mechanism, casting a shadow on the future development of BRICS.
To explain India's policy change towards the BRICS cooperation mechanism, it is necessary to understand the "original intention" of India's participation in the BRICS cooperation mechanism. In April 2009, the four BRICS countries held their first summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia, which launched the cooperation mechanism among BRICS countries. In September, the G20 held the third Leaders' summit in Pittsburgh, the United States, during which Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh sighed: We are finally sitting at the main table. On the one hand, this sentence truly reflects India's long-held great power ambitions, on the other hand, it also shows India's dissatisfaction with the long-term limitations of the Western-dominated international system, and India has a strong political will to amend and change the current unfair and unreasonable international system. Therefore, India naturally supports the establishment of the BRICS cooperation mechanism and the collective effort to promote the reform of the international system.
At the same time, there was still a strong anti-Western, anti-Western, anti-Western and anti-Western feeling in India. The signing of a civil nuclear energy agreement between India and the United States in 2008 triggered serious political debate and internal unrest in India, and left forces such as the Communist Party of India, which is ruling in coalition with the Congress Party, firmly opposed the Indian government's "pro-American" policy. At that time, the United States engaged in quantitative easing policies, which caused turbulence in the domestic financial markets of developing countries such as India. On issues such as climate change, the West, led by the United States, has put more pressure on major developing countries such as China and India, which has stimulated the BRICS countries to recognize their common interests in facing the West.
Equally important, the establishment of the BRICS cooperation mechanism is tantamount to recognizing India as a major power with global influence and the only "hegemon" in South Asia. In the past, the South Asia policies of the major powers always linked India and Pakistan. In the BRICS cooperation mechanism, there is only India but no Pakistan, so that India finally got rid of the dual relationship between India and Pakistan, indirectly recognizing India as the most powerful emerging power in South Asia.
Because of this background, India actively promoted the construction of the BRICS cooperation mechanism at the beginning of its establishment. At the New Delhi Summit in 2012, India proposed the idea of a multilateral financial institution among BRICS countries, which directly facilitated the establishment of the New Development Bank in 2014 and the BRICS Contingent Reserve Facility (CRA) in 2016. In terms of strategic concept, India also agrees with the goal of pursuing multi-polarization, so it pursues the BRICS cooperation to balance the dominant position of the West in the global system, so that the major developing countries can collectively gain greater global bargaining power. In terms of international development policies, China has also actively promoted efforts to help developing countries finance infrastructure construction, and supported initiatives such as the China-led establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Understanding the background and original intention of India's participation in the BRICS cooperation mechanism, we can understand the reasons why India has adopted a negative attitude towards the BRICS cooperation mechanism. After more than a decade of development of the BRICS cooperation mechanism, major changes have taken place in the international environment and China-India relations. The contradictions between India and other countries on the direction of the BRICS cooperation mechanism are expanding, not the other way around.
The most direct manifestation is that India has strongly opposed the expansion of the BRICS cooperation mechanism in recent years, believing that the BRICS cooperation mechanism can only be a "club" and a symbol of identity enjoyed by developing countries, and cannot be easily expanded to other countries. Moreover, India is worried that once the expansion process of the BRICS cooperation mechanism is launched, India will inevitably face the possibility of Pakistan joining.
The root cause of India's negative attitude toward the BRICS cooperation mechanism is the great changes that have taken place in India's internal affairs. Since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Modi came to power in 2014, the left and center-left political forces in India have been gradually marginalized, forming a political situation in which the right wing dominates. As a result, the balance force in India's domestic and foreign policies has ceased to exist. Based on its traditional ideological preferences, the BJP has adopted a pro-American and pro-Western foreign policy. In May 2019, after taking office, Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar clearly positioned India as a "South Westem Power", and in actual policies, more emphasis was placed on the common position and interests of India and the West, downplaying the common interests of India and the BRICS countries. To this end, India has focused its multilateral diplomacy on the Group of 30 and increased interaction with the Group of Seven and even NATO, while downplaying India's membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS cooperation mechanisms.
On the basis of changes in India's internal affairs, India's policy towards China has also undergone fundamental changes. After the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020, the United States further adopted a policy of suppression and containment against China. India cooperated with the United States in suppressing and containing China, and at the same time, with the outbreak of the Galavan conflict on the China-India border, it greatly adjusted its policy toward China, so that it adopted the practice of "antagonizing" China to some extent on international multilateral platforms, and even once threatened to "confront" China in the SCO and BRICS cooperation mechanisms.
India has adopted a competitive and confrontation-led approach in its China policy, which is also reflected in BRICS cooperation. India believes that China is advancing its strategy to dominate Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative, so it is trying to balance the expansion of China's influence with the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, Japan and other countries, and is trying to promote the multi-polarization of Asia aimed at balancing China, and India is also trying to block the possibility of China's "control" of the mechanism in BRICS cooperation. The 50/50 governance structure adopted by the BRICS New Development Bank is considered by India as a mechanism design that can balance China's influence and should be generally applied to all aspects of the future BRICS cooperation mechanism.
The current negative perceptions and policies of India towards BRICS cooperation will affect the future development of the BRICS cooperation mechanism. Given that India's domestic and foreign affairs are less likely to change in the short term, it is necessary to look at the Indian factor from a longer-term perspective, focusing on diluting or eliminating the negative impact that India may have. In terms of actual policies, we should not place too high expectations on India's return to the "original aspiration" of BRICS cooperation. Although the goal of the BRICS cooperation mechanism is not anti-American and Western, it naturally tends to revise the international system dominated by the United States and the West because it pays more attention to the common interests and overall interests of developing countries. India under the Bharatiya Janata Party has changed its past policy preferences and is now more willing to become the "leading party" of the West in the global South, focusing more on the "global South" to bring India closer to the United States and the Western world as a whole, rather than speaking for the interests of developing countries.
At the same time, we still have to work hard to overcome the impact of China-India bilateral relations on the BRICS cooperation mechanism. It is natural for China and India to have widening differences on BRICS cooperation, as China and India are at different stages of development and international status, and it is not surprising that there are differences in various aspects. On the other hand, China and India should try their best to seek common ground while reserving differences and not bring bilateral conflicts and problems to the multilateral platform.
Finally, the BRICS cooperation mechanism should be adjusted and amended based on the current situation of China-India relations and with a long-term view. For example, the member countries of the BRICS cooperation have a mechanism to enter the cooperation mechanism, but there is no decision-making mechanism to exit the cooperation mechanism. Moreover, the BRICS countries have previously followed the principle of consensus decision-making. In the future, as the number of member states increases, there may be more and more differences, and whether to consider the mechanism of majority decision-making is an issue that needs to be considered.
Lin Minwang - Researcher, School of International Studies, Fudan University, China.
International Cooperation Center