Uriel Araujo, researcher with a focus on international and ethnic conflicts
On Sunday, Brahim Ghali, president of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), called upon the African Union to exert pressure on Morocco to end what he described as an “illegal military occupation” of Western Sahara – calling the conflict an “African question, above all”. Last month the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was the first Arab state to open a consulate in the Western Sahara, thus recognizing Moroccan claims over it. Jordan is also considering in doing the same. This is a disputed region: around 20% of its territory is controlled by the self-proclaimed SADR and the remaining 80% of it is administered by the Moroccan government. Both Morocco and the SADR claim the entirety of the territory.
Formerly a Spanish colony, Western Sahara had the control of its territory relinquished to a joint Moroccan-Mauritanian administration in 1975. However, the Western Sahara War erupted when the Polisario Front – which wanted full sovereignty – took to arms against both Mauritania (1975-1979) and Morocco (1975-1991). This rebel organization considers itself a national liberation movement that represents the Sahrawi people, an ethnic group composed of several mixed tribes of Arab, Berber, and Black African elements.
Today, Morocco controls the largest part of the region, while the Polisario Front (which is backed by Algeria) controls the border region with Algeria. The SADR is a full member of the African Union and maintains diplomatic relations with 40 UN states. The position of the United Nations has been that the Polisario Front is a legitimated representative of the Sahrawi people and is entitled to self-determination. SADR’s embassies are present in 18 states. The republic was recognized by 85 states but 44 of them withdrew recognition for varied reasons.
On the other hand, Morocco’s claims to Western Sahara have been supported by both the Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union, even though the latter has not made a unanimous statement about its position on the issue.
For a long time, since the end of the war in 1991, the “lack of violence” in the disputed region has puzzled observers, but not anymore. Since September 2020, the Polisario Front’s provocative moves in Guerguerat escalated tensions in the region and started a conflict. Guerguerat – located 11 km from the Mauritania border and just 5 km from the Atlantic Ocean – is seen as a kind of barrier protecting the European Union. The Polisario Front in fact has already declared "war".
There has been a lot of changes and realignments in the region - how could this impact the situation in Western Sahara?
In February, Israel pushed the US to recognize Moroccan claims on Western Sahara if Morocco normalized its relations with Israel. This initiative did not advance despite Israel trying to strike the deal several times since 2018. In October, a senior US official, David Schenker (Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs), claimed during a special briefing that US recognition of Morocco’s claim was "not on the table".
It is perhaps not a coincidence that the UAE has recently signed peace agreements with Israel – as have Bahrain and Sudan. In fact, Bahrain will also open a consulate in the Western Saharan city of Laayoune. The decision to do so came after a telephone conversation between the kings of Morocco and Bahrain at the end of November.
Meanwhile, there is a “cold war” going on between Turkey and some Arab states (mostly Saudi Arabia and the UAE), who all maintain very close relations with Morocco. Turkey in a way remains a large funder of what some describe as the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara – Moroccan companies in the region have exported fishmeal to Turkey, worth approximately $100 million in 2019. Turkey has supported Morocco's intervention in Guerguera. So, from a certain perspective, the Western Sahara conflict can be seen as a proxy war between Turkey and a coalition of Arab states.
Furthermore, the issue may test Turkish-Algerian ties as the latter supports the Sahrawi. In other words, the Algeria-Morocco rivalry (extending to Western Sahara) has aligned with the Turkish-Arab dispute. Morocco is repairing and “resetting” its relations with Saudi Arabia. Turkey aligns with Israel and France over Western Sahara, while in the East Mediterranean issue, both France and Israel align with Greece against Turkey.
France claims neutrality in the conflict, but has been supporting the Moroccan proposal, which would give Western Sahara some autonomy, and defended Moroccan “advanced status” within the European Neighborhood Policy which paves the way for high level political cooperation with the European Union. One should remember that in 1987 Morocco even applied to join the European Communities (the precursor to the current European Union). This application was rejected, but Morocco has always maintained very close relations with the EU and benefits from economic cooperation – for example, within the scope of the European Neighborhood Instrument, between €1.3 to €1.6 billion was allocated for bilateral assistance. France has been a major supporter of Euro-Mediterranean integration.
The Western Sahara conflict is thus a complex issue in which several geopolitical interests converge and/or contradict themselves.
Regarding the ethnic-national issue, sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein in his famous 1987 article already stated - in line with his position that statehood often precedes nationhood and not the other way around - that “if by the year 2000 or perhaps 2020, Polisario wins the current war, there will have been a Sahrawi nation. And if Morocco wins, there will not have been. Any historian writing in 2100 will take it as a settled question, or more probably still as a non-question.”
Every state that finds itself sovereign and internationally recognized as such may face internal and external aggression. Governments in power have an interest in promoting feelings of nationalism and a “macro-identity” that encompasses many subgroups while dissidents and “ethnic entrepreneurs” groups (as social scientist Rogers Brubakers calls them), on the other hand, have an interest in promoting intra-group feelings and identities (which often are multi-layered and ambiguous) – regardless of their goals and grievances being just or not. Sometimes they clearly are. Sometimes they are not. And very often, it is just complicated.
Although we have reached the end of 2020, the Sahrawian dispute remains unsettled. It would seem it will remain this way for a long time.
